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CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION: 
DECIDING WHEN TO DECIDE 
Carl McGowan* 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A 
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME 
COURT. By Jesse H Choper. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
1980. Pp. xviii, 415. $28.50. 
In a searching and acute lecture on American jurisprudence at 
the Law Session of the Salzburg Seminar last summer, Edward H. 
Levi - who has pursued this subject over many years both in an 
academic environment and in the sharply contrasting circumstances 
of his service as Attorney General of the United States- concluded 
that: 
The distinctive quality of American jurisprudence and of the American 
style of government is to be found in the role of the courts. There may 
be other distinctive qualities, but for an understanding of American 
jurisprudence and government, the role of the courts must be recog-
nized and explored. 
This has been peculiarly true of the role of the United States 
Supreme Court in constitutional interpretation. The nature and 
scope of that role has long been the central preoccupation of many of 
this country's leading legal scholars. 1 The literature generated by it 
continues to grow, and the year just ended has seen two major acces-
sions to it. One was Harvard Professor John Hart Ely's book, .De-
mocracy and .Distrust. Rejecting the approaches of both the broad 
and the strict constructionists of the Constitution, Ely asserted that 
the Court's proper function is to assure participation by all of the 
people in the shaping of public policy by readings of the Constitu-
tion that are "participation-oriented" and "representation-reinforc-
• Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
I. A distinguished observer from abroad, Professor H.L.A. Hart, has remarked upon the 
virtually obsessional nature of this concentration by American legal scholars upon the judicial 
process: 
"In fact, the most famous decisions of the Supreme Court have at once been so important 
and so controversial in character and so unlike what ordinary courts ordinarily do in 
deciding cases that no serious jurisprudence or philosophy of law could avoid asking with 
what general conception of the nature of law were such judicial powers compatible." 
Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble .Dream, 11 
GA, L. REV. 969, 971 (1977). 
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ing."2 
The second entry into this arena is the subject of this Review. 
Professor Jesse Choper, throughout a long and brilliant career as a 
teacher of constitutional law at Boalt Hall in Berkeley, has been one 
of the keenest and most assiduous of our Supreme Court watchers. 
The ultimate reflections emerging from that intense and prolonged 
experience are brought together in this book, which is based in major 
part on the Thomas M. Cooley Lectures given by Professor Choper 
at the University of Michigan Law School in 1977. 
Unlike many of those who have ploughed the field of constitu-
tional adjudication by the Supreme Court, Professor Choper's 
avowed concern is not with how the clauses of the Constitution 
should be interpreted, but rather with whether the Court should in 
certain classes of cases engage in adjudication at all. His objectives 
are to define the proper limits of the Court's review function and to 
formulate the principles which should guide it in determining 
whether to decide, or to withhold decision, in constitutional contro-
versies tendered to it for review. The focus of this book is, in sum, 
on the justiciability of constitutional disputes, as distinct from the 
proper resolution of their merits. 
I 
Professor Choper's point of departure in this inquiry is that the 
Court's reviewing power is, in the large, at odds with the assump-
tions underlying a democratic system of governance. Unlike the 
members of Congress and the President, who accede to office only by 
popular vote and who are periodically accountable to the electorate 
for what they do while in power, the Justices need only nomination 
by the President and confirmation by the Senate to acquire a lifetime 
tenure which can end only with death, incapacitation, voluntary res-
ignation, or impeachment. They are even immune, as we have re-
cently been reminded, from the intimidating sanction of reduction in 
compensation.3 According to Professor Choper, these characteristics 
give judges a strongly antimajoritarian cast that makes it anomalous, 
to say the least, for them to be the exclusive vessels of revealed truth 
as to the meaning and operation of the words of the Constitution. 
Professor Choper is not content, it should quickly be added, 
merely to assert on faith that the judiciary is the least democratic of 
the three branches of the federal establishment in both its constitu-
2. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87 (1980). 
3. United States v. Will, 101 S. Ct. 471 (1980). 
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tion and its functioning. In a lengthy first chapter, he indulges in a 
comparative examination of the legislative, executive, and judicial 
departments for the purpose of documenting his thesis that it is the 
last that comes off the worst in terms of its reflection of, and its re-
sponsiveness to, the will of the people. 
Addressing the Congress first, he proceeds, in the manner of a 
skilled and knowledgeable political science instructor, to catalog the 
respects in which that body falls short of the democratic ideal. He 
discusses the inability of the electoral process, operating in geo-
graphical districts rather than at large, to guarantee that the success-
ful candidate will represent the views of more than a small part of 
the total electorate. This is exacerbated by party selection of candi-
dates, the occasional gerrymander, the premium on incumbency, and 
the endemic low voter turnout which plagues this country. 
Professor Choper is at pains to note the antimajoritarian ele-
ments of the functioning of Congress itself: the bicameral structure; 
the overrepresentation in the Senate; the vulnerability of its product 
to the executive veto; the filibuster and its resistance to cloture; the 
existence of powerful committees and, in many cases, of even more 
powerful committee chairmen; the strength of the party leaders; and 
the capacity of the conference committee to alter legislation into 
something significantly different from the initial enactments of either 
House. Hanging over all, of course, is the shadow of the special in-
terest groups, particularly those with well-financed, highly informed, 
and professional lobbies. Viewing all these influences in the round, 
Professor Choper concludes that, at best, the voice of the people in 
the legislative process is "only one of a multitude of interacting 
forces - and a relatively minor one at that" (p. 25). 
But, comparing the undemocratic aspects of Congress and the 
Supreme Court, Professor Choper points out that the negative ele-
ments in the former operate mainly to impede or "to prevent the 
translation of popular wishes into governing rules rather than to pro-
duce laws that are contrary to majority sentiment" (p. 26). He re-
minds us also that, even when bills finally do become law, the 
Supreme Court, by a holding of unconstitutionality, can set the 
whole at naught. And, using the traditional classroom technique, he 
proceeds to reexamine all the clogs he has just identified in the func-
tioning of Congress, concluding that, in terms of their an-
tidemocratic potential, they are not nearly as mischievous as he has 
first made them out to be. 
It is surely not necessary for me to identify all the considerations 
which Professor Choper employs in reversing his field, since they 
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will have already occurred to most readers of this Review. They 
consist of such propositions as that (1) bicameralism, and even 
filibusters, advance democratic ends by compelling greater consider-
ation of important policy issues and increasing awareness and under-
standing by the public of the values at stake, (2) thoroughgoing 
reforms have been recently made in the committee system, (3) lead-
ers in actual practice tend to press their members to vote their con-
stituents' preferences, and ( 4) there are a growing number of large 
and effective "citizens' lobbies" that are redressing the balance with 
the professionals and making known to Congress the interests and 
desires of a wider variety of people. 
Turning to the executive branch, Professor Choper remarks on 
the strong influence that the President, the single federal official 
elected by a national constituency, can bring to bear upon the legis-
lative process. Armed with the veto and the two-thirds override re-
quirement, and possessed of many carrots and sticks with which to 
put pressure on individual members of Congress, the President him-
self "greatly enhances the democratic image of the political 
branches" (p. 46) of the federal system. The only major blemish on 
this image is the "smoke-filled-room" selection of presidential nomi-
nees. But this cloud has, in Professor Choper's view, been substan-
tially dissipated by the increasing use of presidential primaries and 
recent reforms in nominating convention delegate selection. 
Professor Choper apparently to the contrary, many shrewd and 
experienced observers of presidential nominations have come to be-
lieve that the caliber of the chosen nominees has visibly declined in 
recent years and look back wistfully to the products of the earlier 
methods. The primary system has tended to give the communica-
tions media perhaps the greatest power to affect the choices of the 
national parties; and the selection process itself has been prolonged 
interminably, thus distracting an incumbent president seeking a sec-
ond term from more important matters of public business. This has 
led to much talk of a national primary if the primary system is to be 
used at all; and sentiment is palpably strengthening for a single six-
year presidential term by constitutional amendment. 
With these reservations, however, it remains true, as Professor 
Choper insist~, that "the American presidency . . . comes closer to 
the majoritarian ideal than practically any other national office in 
the modem western democracies" (p. 47). Certainly its political ac-
countability to the people at large far surpasses that of the Supreme 
Court, despite the political controls that can be exerted upon the 
Court through constitutional amendment, budgetary and term limi-
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tations, Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation of appoin-
tees, and the power vested in Congress to regulate the Court's 
appellate jurisdiction. 
Throughout our history as a nation, however, these controls have 
arguably been less than significantly effective, although they remain 
as ever-present dangers to the Court itself. Because of that vulnera-
bility, and the Court's own lack of political power to resist them, 
Professor Choper formulates the central theme of his book - the 
necessity for the Court to avoid confrontations with the legislative 
and executive branches that might put its popular capital at risk. 
This is to be achieved by the Court's refusal to adjudicate issues 
which are likely to mobilize resistance and the deployment against it 
of the immensely greater political resources available to the Con-
gress and the President - greater, indeed, because they derive from 
the very majoritarian foundations of those bodies that the Court 
lacks. 
II 
Professor Choper's plea that the Court protect itself by self-deny-
ing limitations on the use of the judicial power vested in it by article 
III is subject to being characterized as a craven counsel of weakness. 
It is, therefore, appropriate at this point to summarize his precise 
prescription for the Court's salvation. 
Preliminarily, Professor Choper acknowledges that the Constitu-
tion itself is not without its undemocratic features. No part can be 
changed by simple majority will; although its purpose was mainly to 
create a framework of government in which democracy could 
broadly prevail, the powers granted by it to achieve this purpose are 
carefully limited; and the protection and preservation of individual 
rights and liberties was one of its essential goals. It exists, as James 
Madison said, to protect the individual from majority rule, since "the 
invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts 
of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts 
in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major 
number of the Constituents."4 
Putting to one side the parts of the Constitution which address 
housekeeping details, the provisions of that document fall, in Profes-
sor Choper's submission, -into three categories: the separation of 
powers within the federal government, the division of powers be-
tween that government and the states, and the designation of those 
4. 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 272 (G. Hunt ed. 1904). 
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individual rights and liberties to be protected from invasion or nulli-
fication by either the federal or state governments. It is for the last of 
these constitutional purposes that Professor Choper conceives judi-
cial review to be absolutely essential, and to be exercised by the 
Supreme Court without equivocation or concern for its own public 
image. Indeed, it is by way of assuring the Court's power to decide 
controversies in this area - and to live to fight another day - that 
restraint is suggested in the other two categories. 
Thus, Professor Choper stands foursquare on the central proposi-
tion that the Supreme Court should bring its full adjudicatory pow-
ers to bear with respect to claims of governmental transgression 
upon individual rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Beyond that Individual Rights Proposal, and in furtherance of it, he 
makes three additional Proposals. 
The Federalism Proposal is that the federal judiciary should re-
frain from deciding constitutional issues relating to the reach of na-
tional power vis-a-vis the states. Any claim of improper federal 
intrusion into the powers of the states should be deemed nonjusticia-
ble; its resolution should be left to the political interplay between the 
Congress and the President. 
It is important to note, however, that the Federalism Proposal 
does not extend to federal court review of state laws or actions which 
impinge upon federal powers and rights. 5 This is principally because 
the federal government is not represented in state and local legisla-
tive bodies (in contrast with the representation which the states have 
in the Congress); and, accordingly, effective protection of federal 
concerns requires review by the federal courts. In addition, federal 
court rulings in this area tend not to deal with significant constitu-
tional issues; such decisions may usually be revised by the political 
branches of the national government through ordinary federal stat-
utes. The Supreme Court's work in this field more frequently in-
volves statutory, rather than constitutional, interpretation, and thus 
the tension between constitutional adjudication and majoritarian de-
mocracy is not customarily present. 
Professor Choper's Separation Proposal, as he terms the second 
of his suggestions for judicial restraint, is limited to controversies in-
volving the Constitution's allocation of authority between the legis-
5, This echoes Justice Holmes's familiar pronouncement: 
I do not think the United States would come to an end ifwe lost our power to declare an 
Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled ifwe could not make that 
declaration as to the laws of the several States. 
0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920). 
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lative and executive branches of the national government. Choper 
proposes that the federal courts should treat all constitutional issues 
involving the respective powers of Congress and the President as 
nonjusticiable, leaving their resolution to the workings of the na-
tional political process. This is to be so whether the constitutional 
claims derive from executive action (or failure to act) affecting the 
prerogatives of Congress, or from congressional action ( or omission) 
touching the powers of the President. Although the Supreme Court 
has in the more remote past not been faced with too many of these 
executive-legislative conflicts, they have increased in number in re-. 
cent years, and bid fair to keep on doing so. In no such case are the 
merits of such issues to be explored and decided by the courts. 
In his enunciation of the third principle in this series defining the 
appropriate exercise of judicial review, Professor Choper returns to 
the strongly affirmative approach of his Individual Rights Proposal. 
Indeed, it is primarily for the purpose of safeguarding the Supreme 
Court's power to function effectively in that area that he formulates 
what he calls his Judicial Proposal. It declares that the Supreme 
Court should be alert to detect and nullify efforts by either the Con-
gress or the President to restrict or expand improperly the scope and 
reach of the judicial power created in article III of the Constitution. 
Threats to the federal judiciary of this nature may take a variety 
of forms. Questions may be raised as to whether the Congress has 
provided for judicial resolution of matters that are not "Cases" or 
"Controversies" as envisaged by article III, or whether Congress has 
directed the exercise by the Supreme Court of original or appellate 
jurisdiction exceeding that allocated to the Court by that article. 
Similarly, efforts by the Congress to prescribe the manner of the 
Court's functioning (e.g., final decision-making by panels of the 
Supreme Court, or delegation of its authority to lesser bodies) may 
conflict with the constitutional commitment of the federal judicial 
power to the "one supreme Court" contemplated by article III. Fur-
ther, legislative regulation of the assignment, suspension, or removal 
of federal judges, or dictation as to how the judges shall go about 
performing their tasks, could contradict constitutional assurances of 
judicial independence. 
All such questions, says Professor Choper, are not only to be en-
tertained, but also decided, by the federal judges, even if in particu-
lar instances they do not significantly affect the rights and liberties of 
individual persons but present only relatively pure separation of 
powers issues. Where the judiciary's rights and prerogatives under 
the Constitution are threatened with impairment, any individual 
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should be accorded standing to assert those rights on behalf of the 
federal courts. Nothing less will suffice to maintain the ability of the 
federal courts to interpose the shield of the Constitution between all 
individuals and their governments. 
The rationale behind the Judiciary Proposal mainly consists of 
two elements. One is that, with no independent political base and 
with both tradition and ethical canons barring it from any participa-
tion in politics, the federal judiciary has neither representation in 
Congress nor influence within the executive branch. It is thus poorly 
equipped to tum back threats from those quarters at their very in-
ception. Second, the judges are peculiarly expert, by education and 
tradition, in identifying the nature of judicial power and prescribing 
for its preservation. They are the natural guardians of that power, 
and it is wholly appropriate that they should marshal and exert their 
full resources to protect the ':iudicial Power of the United States" 
committed to them by the Constitution. 
III 
Of Professor Choper's four Proposals - which together consti-
tute the core of his book - surely his Individual Rights Proposal 
will command the greatest measure of assent and acceptance. That 
is evident from the range of powerful and respected voices that have 
spoken to the same theme. 
In commending the Bill of Rights to the First Congress as a vital 
addition to the Constitution, James Madison prophetically stated 
that "independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a 
peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impen-
etrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative 
or executive."6 More than a century later, Justice Holmes reported 
the view of his colleague Justice Brandeis to be that "the best defense 
. . . 'for leaving fundamental responsibilities to this Court' was that 
constitutional restrictions enabled minorities to get an untroubled 
night's sleep."7 It was Earl Warren's eventual view that "[t]he essen-
tial function of the Supreme Court in our democracy is to act as the 
final arbiter of minority rights .... " 8 And the always eloquent 
Justice Robert Jackson, speaking for the Court in West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette9 said: 
6. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 439 (1834). 
7. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 37 (1970). 
8. Warren, Fourteenth Amendment: Retrospect and Prospect, in THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 212, 228 (B. Schwartz ed. 1970). 
9. 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
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The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects 
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal princi-
ples to be applied by the courts. 
Professor Choper rightly concludes that "at diverse but continual pe-
riods of American history, individuals and minority groups of all 
ideological shades have looked to the Court as the supreme guaran-
tor of personal liberty against majority will . . ." (p. 67). 
The justification for assigning this role to the Court resides in its 
very remoteness from the ebbs and flows of the political tides, and its 
consequent immunity from the vagaries of the ballot box. There is, 
moreover, a rational quality inherent in judicial reflection and deci-
sion which makes for an objectivity that is difficult to achieve in the 
legislative chambers or the Oval Office. This is documented by Pro-
fessor Choper's lengthy and learned review of the Court's decisions 
in the individual rights area since 1935. The Hughes, Stone, and 
Vinson Courts made significant advances in the protection of indi-
vidual rights, providing a sturdy foundation upon which the Warren 
Court could - and did - build to a truly remarkable degree, espe-
cially in the context of racial equality, the rights of the criminally 
accused, freedom of expression, and legislative reapportionment. 
As for the Burger Court, Professor Choper does not share the 
views of those who were quick to declaim that it was a disaster for 
civil rights. Looking to the record of its actual performance over 
what is now more than a decade, he concludes that, although it "has 
often upheld the claims of those alleging popular disregard of their 
constitutionally secured individual rights," it has not exhibited "the 
extraordinarily sensitive stance of the Warren Court" (p. 107). But, 
says Professor Choper, it has already exceeded any of its predeces-
sors in its invalidation of statutes on first amendment and equal pro-
tection grounds, "and, indeed, on several issues, has moved well 
beyond the lines established in 1969" (p. 107). These advances have 
included a notable expansion of the right to privacy, especially with 
respect to abortions; extension of the right to counsel to indigent mis-
demeanants; a sweeping improvement in the procedures for revoking 
probation and parole; severe restrictions of the availability of the 
death penalty; and delineation of a substantive constitutional right to 
liberty for involuntarily detained mental patients. 
These steps alone would appear to ensure that, in any final reck-
oning, the contemporary Court cannot fairly be cast into the outer 
darkness of unrelieved obscurantism for its attitude toward the con-
stitutional rights and liberties of the individual. Although partisans 
of particular Courts seem to find it emotionally satisfying to compare 
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their favorites to the disadvantage of the others, the important thing 
is that progress toward the ideal be steady and continuous, albeit 
arguably uneven. Professor Choper's review of the civil rights sensi-
tivities of the changing Courts of the middle years of the twentieth 
century will convince most of his readers that this progression has 
occurred to a remarkable degree. At the least, his review provides a 
powerful and altogether persuasive demonstration that his Individ-
ual Rights Proposal articulates a sound standard of judicial review 
for constitutional adjudication. 
As indicated above, Professor Choper regards his Judicial Propo-
sal as serving a supportive role for his Individual Rights Proposal. It 
deals, as he points out, with what is in reality a subclassification of 
the Separation Proposal in that it addresses a tension that can arise 
between the political and the judicial branches. 
Thus it is that those who look with favor on the Individual Rights 
Proposal will also readily embrace the Judicial Proposal, and rightly 
so. In so doing, they can be comforted by the fact that, historically, 
even those who took the narrowest view of the proper scope of judi-
cial review of constitutional controversies never doubted the Fram-
ers' purpose to enable the judicial branch to protect itself from the 
crippling of its functioning by the political branches. James 
Madison himself said that the Supreme Court's article III jurisdic-
tion to decide cases arising under the Constitution ought to be "lim-
ited to cases of a Judiciary Nature." 10 The first Act of Congress 
found unconstitutional by the federal courts fell because it tried to 
saddle article III courts with nonjudicial functions.II Marbury itself, 
in its actual holding, involved a similar defect, thereby exposing 
most of Chief Justice Marshall's sweeping delineation of the reach of 
judicial review to the charge of being dicta. It was not until .Dred 
Scott was decided in 1857 that the Supreme Court struck down a 
federal statute for reasons other than improper trespass upon the ju-
dicial power defined in article III. 
Many questions remain unresolved, of course, with respect to the 
powers of Congress to divest, restrict, or expand the jurisdiction of 
10. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). 
l I. See Haybum's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). Congress had vested the power to 
rule on pension applications in the circuit courts, but had given the Secretary of War and 
finally the Congress the power to review those determinations. See 2 U.S. at 410 n.l. The 
Circuit Court for the District of New York, as well as those of several other districts, held that 
the provisions for review by nonjudicial officers transformed pension decisions into nonjudi-
cial business beyond the power delegated to the federal courts by article III. Confronted with 
this thorny constitutional question, the Supreme Court held the Government's appeal over for 
a term on the issue of whether the Government could represent pension applicants, and was 
rescued by the passage of fresh pension legislation. See 2 U.S. at 409-10. 
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the Supreme Court - some of which could pose serious threats to 
the functioning of the Court in the area of individual rights. Profes-
sor Choper identifies these questions in a singularly interesting pas-
sage in his book. But, in accordance with the general theme of his 
inquiry, he does not undertake to assert how they ought to be de-
cided, but only that the Court should invariably perceive the making 
of such decisions as part of its duty. 
IV 
The Federalism Proposal and the Separation Proposal, contem-
plating as they do the staying of the Court's hand, are the most dra-
matic and challenging aspects of Professor Choper's book. As such, 
they are the least likely to evoke agreement, particularly among 
those enthusiastic partisans of the Court who consider its function to 
be that of deciding all controversies within its jurisdiction, however 
the chips may fall. 
In Professor Choper's conception, the justification for his coun-
sels of restraint lies in his concern that the Court's decisions in these 
fields will diminish its popular acceptance and thereby endanger its 
effectiveness in the all-important area of individual rights. It may be 
questioned, however, whether he is unduly apprehensive about the 
danger of popular rejection and political retaliation. There have, of 
course, been periods in our national history when public opposition 
to the Court's decisions has led Congress to attempt to limit its juris-
diction or the Executive to refuse to enforce its edicts. But, from the 
second quarter of the nineteenth century (when Daniel Webster, as 
chairman successively of the House and Senate Judiciary Commit-
tees, fended off efforts to cut the Court down to size) to the 1950s 
(when the Conference of State Chief Justices urged legislation to 
curb the Warren Court) the Court emerged unscathed, thanks to the 
opposition rallied in large part by the leaders of the organized Bar. 
Franklin Roosevelt, at the pinnacle of his political power after 
his overwhelming reelection to a second term in 1936, thought that 
he could shape the Court more nearly to his liking, and pressed upon 
Congress his notorious court-packing plan. But even those who 
shared his dismay with some of the Court's decisions in the first flush 
of the New Deal put their loyalty to the Court as an institution first, 
and the President suffered the inost resounding political defeat of his 
entire career. 
More recently, of course, the country has seen the emergence of 
interest groups who march to the sound of a single drum, and to 
whom the concept of a broader national interest appears to be utterly 
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alien. They have mounted attacks upon some of the decisions of 
both the Warren and the Burger Courts, particularly in the field of 
privacy and religion, but so far at least they have been unavailing, 
and they appear likely to suffer the frustrations of their predecessors 
who have tried to clip the wings of the Court. 
This is not to say that Professor Choper's fears are wholly with-
out foundation, or that he does not perform a useful service in sug-
gesting ways in which the Court can, without jettisoning its critically 
important functions, secure its position by voluntary abstinence from 
decision in less vital areas. But the relevant criterion for appraising 
his two proposals for suspension of judicial decision making is the 
relative importance of his suggested subjects for such restraint. Few 
would say that the subject matter of either the Federalism or the 
Separation Proposal is as important as that of the Individual Rights 
Proposal. But it may be that, between the two Proposals themselves, 
there are differences of significance to the value of judicial resolu-
tion. 
In unveiling his Federalism Proposal, Professor Choper is at 
some pains to point out that, when the constitutional issue is whether 
the state or the national government has the power to regulate the 
subject in question, there is not a vacuum in which no government 
may act. The question is which government, and the presumption is 
that, if the problem calling for government action is truly serious, 
constitutional power to address it exists in one place or the other. 
This contrasts strongly with a constitutional claim of an individual 
right or liberty, where redress assumes a void which no government 
may fill. 
Thus, the withholding of decision by the Court under the Feder-
alism Proposal leaves the question of which government shall act for 
the political branches of government to resolve; and the interplay 
(primarily in Congress, where the states have a voice) will determine 
what is to be done, and who is to do it. Professor Choper also asserts 
that the Court's holdings against national authority in the federal-
state context have not survived for long, and that, saving the Court's 
most recent venture into this field in National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 12 there is almost no state's rights decision of any consequence 
that has endured. 
The lessons drawn from all this by Professor Choper are that par-
ticipation by the Supreme Court is not essential to the working of the 
federal system, that the political processes of the nation have over 
12. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
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time provided resolutions of these problems, and that the Court can 
justifiably spare itself the flak which inevitably descends upon those 
who get in the middle of a contest over the reach of national power 
as against the states. And when one is reminded of the Child Labor 
Cases 13 and United States v. Butler, 14 one is hard put to believe that 
disposition by the Supreme Court of these cases was either necessary 
or meaningful in view of the long-run shift of social and economic 
opinion. And there are other cases, reaching various results, that 
now seem like empty battles of a by-gone era, and have had little or 
no impact on the shape of things to come. Certainly any individual 
rights implicated were not protected from regulation by a govern-
ment, the only question being which government. 
The rationalization Professor Choper employs to support his 
Federalism Proposal is not apt, as he explicitly recognizes, for the 
Separation Proposal. Individual rights and liberties can be mightily 
affected by controversies between Congress and President, as was 
recognized by such disparate political philosophers as Justices 
Frankfurter and Douglas in the Steel Seizure Case, where both 
harked back to Justice Brandeis's statement in Myers: 
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Conven-
tion of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of 
arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means 
of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the government 
powers among three departments, to save the people from autocracy. 15 
In the face of this principle, Professor Choper can only assert that 
it is by no means clear that the Framers "intended the Court to en-
force the separation of powers or that judicial review is necessary to 
resolve constitutional clashes between Congress and the President" 
(p. 265). He appeals to Montesquieu as authority that the constitu-
tional theory of separation of powers envisaged no judicial role but 
relied instead on internal checks within a bicameral legislature, with 
both houses being "checked by executive power, as the executive is 
by the legislative."16 Thus, says Professor Choper, the Supreme 
13. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (child labor tax not a valid exercise 
of taxing power); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (prohibition of interstate ship• 
ment of products of child labor not within the ambit of commerce power). 
14. 297 U.S. I (1936). The Butler majority, over the dissent of Justices Stone, Brandeis, 
and Cardozo, held that the taxing and spending power did not provide a basis for federal 
payments to farmers who reduced their crop acreage or the tax on the processing of that crop 
that financed the payments. 
15. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 613-14 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring); 343 U.S. at 629-30 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 
U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
16. C. MONTESQUIEU, L'ESPRIT DES LOIS (1748), reprinted in J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 266 (1980). 
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Court may safely leave conflicts in this regard to the inevitable ac-
commodations reached by the shifting fortunes of political power. 
In so doing, the Court stays above the political fray, preserving its 
political capital from the erosions of partisan strife, and assuring that 
it will have the authority and acceptability necessary to protect indi-
vidual rights against impairment by either of the political branches. 
The Separation Proposal is not quixotic in either its logic or its 
theoretical foundations. But since it represents an exercise of judg-
ment as to what is best for the nation when President and Congress 
collide, and since the cases to which it applies vary so widely in their 
nature and consequences, one cannot but wonder why it must be cast 
in such absolute terms. This abstract formulation of an essentially 
political judgment leaves no room for taking into account particular 
circumstances in which a sound political instinct would point in the 
direction of adjudication rather than abstention. Unresolved, or 
long delayed, accommodations of serious impasses between the two 
political branches are not to be lightly contemplated. The people at 
large may prefer, and the national interest may urgently require, 
speedier and more definitive answers; and dangerous tensions can be 
dissolved by an authoritative and expert voice from a neutral quar-
ter. 
At the time of political crisis caused by Watergate, the communi-
cations media were full of the volunteered and varying views of self-
appointed constitutional prophets as to what the law was or should 
be. In the midst of this confusion, it always seemed to me that the 
country in the large was hungering for a final and authoritative an-
swer from the courts. For them to have refused to rule would not 
only have aggravated the crisis, but would have assured its prolonga-
tion. When the answers came through expedited consideration and 
action by the courts involved, almost everyone experienced a deep 
sense of relief and satisfaction that our system had the machinery in 
place to provide them. 
The major source of this relief, United States v. Nixon, 17 is a case 
which Professor Choper regards as not a true conflict between the 
executive and the legislative branches, and he therefore concludes 
that the Court's decision is not incompatible with the Separation 
Proposal. Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activi-
ties v. Nixon 18 was such a case, however, and it was decided. 
Supreme Court review was never sought, but it seemed to me then, 
17. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
18. 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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as now, that the wiser course under all the circumstances was to re-
solve the constitutional issue presented. 
Two recent cases involving treaties of the United States would, as 
Professor Choper states, clearly have been covered by the Separation 
Proposal. In one, a number of members of the House of Representa-
tives claimed that they were entitled to vote on the question of trans-
ferring the Panama Canal to the Republic of Panama - an action 
which the President was proceeding to accomplish by means of a 
treaty subject only to approval by the Senate. 19 The plaintiff House 
members pointed, with some plausibility, to the provision in article 
IV, § 3, cl. 2 of the Constitution that "Congress shall have power to 
dispose of the Territory or other Property belonging to the United 
States." They stressed the obvious fact that the Congress includes 
the lower as well as the upper chamber. 
The case reached the court of appeals only a short time before 
the final vote was to be taken in the Senate on the Treaty. Promptly 
after the vote, if it was favorable, the President proposed to deposit 
the instruments of ratification, which would affect the immediate 
and irrevocable transfer of United States sovereignty over, and own-
ership of, the Canal. If the losing party at the court of appeals level 
was to have a chance of Supreme Court review before the Senate 
acted, it was necessary for the court of appeals to act fast. 
It did, addressing itself to the merits on a motion by the Govern-
ment for summary affirmance, rather than ruling for the Govern-
ment on standing grounds as had the district court.20 The court 
found that the legislative history of the Constitutional Convention 
clearly revealed that the Framers, in writing the language in ques-
tion, were concerned with the ultimate transfer of the vast western 
lands then held by only some of the existing colonies - a transfer in 
which they wished the Congress as a whole to have a voice. When 
the treaty clause was taken up by the Convention a few days later, 
there was no suggestion that property could not be transferred to 
foreign nations by treaty, as was traditional. 
The day before the Senate voted its consent to the Treaty, the 
Supreme Court denied an injunction against ratification pending dis-
19. Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978). 
20. The court of appeals, noting the need for final resolution of the merils of the issue, 
which could be delayed by any ruling on standing or other preliminary issue such as jus-
ticiability, pretermitted the standing claim, and thereafter decided the merits in the President's 
favor. 580 F.2d at 1056-57. q: Edwards v. Carter, 445 F. Supp. 1279 (D.D.C.), ajfd on other 
grounds, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978) (merits of congressional 
plaintiffs' claim need not be reached as plaintiffs lacked standing to sue President). 
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position of the House members' petition for certiorari.21 It eventu-
ally denied the certiorari petition itself. 22 The Panama Canal 
Treaty, it will be remembered, was not popular within this country, 
although it was thought to be of great importance to our good rela-
tions with Latin American nations. There were many people who 
simply could not understand why we should give the Canal away. It 
surely was not desirable that that feeling be exacerbated by any lin-
gering assumption that the gift had been effectuated in an unconsti-
tutional manner. 
The legal question was a pure matter of constitutional interpreta-
tion. Those for and against the Treaty could argue endlessly about 
that issue, although that would not have been good for the country. 
Both sides were arguably entitled to have the matter authoritatively 
resolved by the courts. This, therefore, was one of those occasions 
when the absolutist character of the Separation Proposal might well 
not have accorded with the public interest. It was, at the least, a 
situation in which the judges, as the accepted and empowered final 
arbiters of what the Constitution means, needed some flexibility in 
determining whether to bring those powers to bear. 
Although the second treaty case, Goldwater v. Carter ,23 had not 
reached the litigation stage when Professor Choper's book went to 
press, he anticipated it by saying that an issue "as to whether the 
President or Congress is authorized to terminate a treaty" (as did 
President Carter himself with respect to Taiwan) is fully within his 
Separation Proposal, and that "no matter how persuasive the sub-
stance of the argument may seem, the ultimate constitutional ques-
tion should be held to be nonjusticiable'' (p. 357). 
The litigation took the form of a claim by individual Senators 
that termination had to be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Sen-
ate, and a claim by several House members that termination re-
quired a majority vote of both Houses. Four members of the 
Supreme Court voted that these contentions were nonjusticiable as 
presenting political questions inappropriate for judicial resolution.24 
One said that the merits should not be reached for lack of ripeness 
21. Edwards v. Carter, 435 U.S. 965 (April 17, 1978) (application for injunction denied); 
Edwards v. Carter, 435 U.S. 1005 (May I, 1978) (motion to expedite consideration of petition 
for writ of certiorari and application for injunction both denied). 
22. Edwards v. Carter, 436 U.S. 907 (May 15, 1978). 
23. 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), vacated mem., 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (plaintiff Sena-
tors had standing to challenge Presidential termination of mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, 
but Constitution did not require Senate concurrence in treaty termination). 
24. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., Burger, C.J., Stewart & 
Stevens, JJ., concurring). 
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since there was no apparent controversy between the Congress and 
the President; the dispute was between the congressional plaintiffs 
and their fellow members from whom they had failed to secure col-
lective condemnation of the President's action.25 
Professor Choper presumably would regard this result as gratify-
ingly responsive to the general spirit of his Separation Proposal, al-
though he would not have thought it necessary to pursue the 
particular rationales advanced for withholding judgment. He might 
well believe that Justice Powell's reason for finding a lack of ripeness 
indicates a lack of the conflict between President and Congress req-
uisite to trigger the Separation Proposal. He would, however, un-
doubtedly lament Justice Powell's insistence that, if Congress had as 
an institution objected to the termination, the constitutional issue 
presented should be decided: 
If the President and the Congress had reached irreconcilable positions, 
final disposition of the question presented by this case would eliminate, 
rather than create, multiple constitutional interpretations. The spectre 
of the Federal Government brought to a halt because of the mutual 
intransigence of the President and the Congress would require this 
Court to provide a resolution pursuant " 'to our duty to say what the 
law is. . .' "26 
The spectre conjured up by Justice Powell stalks Professor 
Choper's Separation Proposal. It is the same nightmare that has 
troubled the repose of millions of Americans - lawyers and laymen 
alike - since Americans began their great adventure in constitu-
tional government. The cloud of anxiety and unease during the days 
of Watergate was formed by fears that the bad dream might become 
reality. When the processes of the law did not bend or break, but 
steadily resolved the legal issues raised, the pall was lifted, and the 
Republic gained new confidence in its capacity for constitutional 
survival. 
It must be true, then, that there are occasions when the states-
manlike course is for the Court to say what the Constitution means 
in relation to clashes between the political branches of the federal 
government which threaten the chaos and confusion of stalemate. It 
is an attribute of greatness among judges to perceive those occasions, 
and to act accordingly. Such occasions may be rare, and forbearance 
from decision may more frequently mark the path of wisdom. But it 
would seem as unwise as it is unnecessary to cast the alternatives in 
the form of absolutes. 
25. 444 U.S. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring). 
26. 444 U.S. at 1001. 
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Major constitutional cases in this area customarily involve not 
demands for damages, but rather for the equitable remedies of in-
junction and declaratory judgment. From the earliest chancellors 
down to the present, the tradition persists of discretion to grant or to 
withhold these modes of relief. This choice is available in constitu-
tional adjudication as elsewhere, and its judicious exercise in the fed-
eral separation of powers area can serve many, if indeed not most, of 
the values underlying Professor Choper's Proposal.27 
V 
Qualification of agreement with one aspect of Professor Choper's 
work is not, however, to lessen an admiring respect for the formida-
ble scholarship and penetrating analysis which are the hallmarks of 
his· highly useful inquiry into the principles that should guide consti-
tutional adjudication by the Supreme Court. The appearance of this 
careful formulation of the conclusions Professor Choper has distilled 
from many years of teaching and reflecting upon the paradox of ju-
dicial review in a ballot-box democracy is an event of surpassing 
importance in the legal :firmament. 
27. In a recent article, I have explored, in greater detail, the value of traditional notions of 
equitable restraint in withholding injunctive remedies and its statutory analogue, judicial dis-
cretion over declaratory relief, in resolving the difficult separation of powers concerns raised 
by congressional suits against the executive branch, such as the Panama Canal and Taiwan 
treaty termination cases. See McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. 
REV. 241 (1981). 
